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Recent theoretical work in developmental psychology suggests that humans are
predisposed to align their mental states with those of other individuals. One way this
manifests is in cooperative communication; that is, intentional communication aimed at
aligning individuals’ mental states with respect to events in their shared environment.
This idea has received strong empirical support. The purpose of this paper is to
extend this account by proposing an integrative model of the biobehavioral dynamics
of cooperative communication. Our formulation is based on active inference. Active
inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and
optimize an individual’s internal model of the world. We propose that humans are
characterized by an evolved adaptive prior belief that their mental states are aligned
with, or similar to, those of conspecifics (i.e., that ‘we are the same sort of creature,
inhabiting the same sort of niche’). The use of cooperative communication emerges as
the principal means to gather evidence for this belief, allowing for the development of a
shared narrative that is used to disambiguate interactants’ (hidden and inferred) mental
states. Thus, by using cooperative communication, individuals effectively attune to a
hermeneutic niche composed, in part, of others’ mental states; and, reciprocally, attune
the niche to their own ends via epistemic niche construction. This means that niche
construction enables features of the niche to encode precise, reliable cues about the
deontic or shared value of certain action policies (e.g., the utility of using communicative
constructions to disambiguate mental states, given expectations about shared prior
beliefs). In turn, the alignment of mental states (prior beliefs) enables the emergence
of a novel, contextualizing scale of cultural dynamics that encompasses the actions
and mental states of the ensemble of interactants and their shared environment. The
dynamics of this contextualizing layer of cultural organization feedback, across scales, to
constrain the variability of the prior expectations of the individuals who constitute it. Our
theory additionally builds upon the active inference literature by introducing a new set of
neurobiologically plausible computational hypotheses for cooperative communication.
We conclude with directions for future research.
Keywords: cooperative communication, mental state alignment, evolution, development, active inference,
adaptive prior, free energy, circular causality
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 417
fpsyg-11-00417 March 23, 2020 Time: 20:10 # 2
Vasil et al. Human Communication as Active Inference
“The point we emphasize is strong confidence in our original
nature,”
Suzuki (1970/2014, p. 35)
INTRODUCTION
An influential body of recent work on human communication
describes it as cooperative communication. Cooperative
communication is defined as intentional communication
aimed at the alignment of mental states between conspecifics
(reviewed in Tomasello, 2008, 2014, 2019). This is thought to
be one particularly important behavioral manifestation of a
broader, species-typical motivation to align mental states with
those of others (Tomasello et al., 2005). Some have hypothesized
that this motivation is the result of selective pressures acting on
human evolution in the context of interdependent collaborative
foraging (Tomasello et al., 2012; Whiten and Erdal, 2012). In
scenarios where individuals in a group must forage together
for resources (food, water, information, etc.), the alignment of
multiple individuals’ goals, intentions, and attentional processes
is necessary for success (e.g., Liebenberg, 2006). This view has
been useful for empirical investigation in developmental and
comparative psychology (reviewed in Call, 2009; Carpenter and
Liebal, 2011; MacLean, 2016).
The purpose of this narrative review is to extend the approach
to cooperative communication introduced above by leveraging
a recent active inference formulation in theoretical neuroscience
and biology (Friston, 2012, 2013; Friston and Ao, 2012). This
formulation of living systems provides a formal account of the
dynamics of belief-guided, embodied action from first principles
of biological self-organization (e.g., Friston et al., 2014; Sengupta
et al., 2016). A formal account is arguably important, because
it forces one to make explicit one’s theoretical predictions in
experimental and modeling work that investigates the usage,
development, and cultural evolution of human communication
(e.g., Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; McCauley and Christiansen,
2014). Furthermore, and although this is not the primary focus
of this work, by proposing an active inference formulation
of cooperative communication, we pave the way for a set
of well specified predictions about the neurocomputational
dynamics underwriting cooperative communication (Friston,
2010; e.g., Bastos et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013; Parr and
Friston, 2017, 2018). This is important, as precisely formulated
neuroscientific hypotheses are largely absent from extant work
on cooperative communication.
In brief, active inference is a mathematical formulation of the
tendency of living systems to maintain themselves in a restricted
set of states (i.e., their phenotypic states) while embedded in
a fluctuating, partially observed environment (Friston, 2012,
2013). More precisely, active inference formalizes the structure
of exchanges between organisms (individuals and groups) and
their environment by explaining how the structure and function
of organisms and their ecological niches become attuned to,
or predictive of, each other (Bruineberg et al., 2018a). In
short, active inference suggests that every organism optimizes
its internal (generative) model of the world via circular or
self-fulfilling action-perception cycles that minimize an upper
bound on biophysical surprise (i.e., variational free-energy).
In turn, the environment becomes attuned to the organisms
that inhabit it (Constant et al., 2019). We will see later that
this is formally equivalent to maximizing the evidence for
internal or generative models of the world – and that when the
world (e.g., the cultural niche) is ‘shared,’ then the generative
models of its denizens become committed to a (reliably)
shared narrative.
Following a recent hypothesis of the embodied human
brain derived from active inference, called the hierarchically
mechanistic mind (Badcock et al., 2019a,b), our proposal
combines active inference with substantive research in
psychology and allied disciplines that captures the specific
evolutionary, developmental, and real-time dynamics that
underlie the human capacity for cooperative communication.
A key corollary of this approach is the construct of an adaptive
prior (Badcock et al., 2019a,b). Adaptive priors are evolutionarily
endowed, heritable beliefs1 that guide characteristic patterns of
cognition and behavior in conspecifics. In other words, adaptive
priors have been shaped by selection to steer action-perception
cycles toward adaptive, unsurprising outcomes (Ramstead et al.,
2018; Badcock et al., 2019a,b). Such priors depend upon genetic,
epigenetic, and/or cultural inheritance, and often incorporate
learned, empirical priors gleaned from experience to allow for
sensitive adaptation to the local environment (Badcock et al.,
2019b). Stated otherwise, adaptive priors effectively constrain the
space of prior beliefs learned during ontogeny to enable adaptive
action in local cultural niches (Badcock et al., 2019b).
Our proposal is as follows. We suggest that natural selection
has endowed humans with an adaptive prior for alignment; i.e.,
an adaptive prior preference for action policies that generate
sensory evidence that reliably indicates that their own mental
states are aligned with, or similar to, those of conspecifics. This
adaptive prior fosters intentional, patterned action sequences
that gather evidence (i.e., sensory observations) for this belief;
that is, that gather evidence for the hypothesis that ‘we
are the same kind of creature, inhabiting the same kind of
niche.’ The adaptive prior here functions to bias action and
inference by leading agents to actively sample their sensorium
in a way that, on average and over time, disambiguates
conspecifics’ (hidden) mental states. This sampling process is
therefore guided by, and generates evidence for, the belief that
our mental states are aligned. In short, we cast cooperative
communication as an evidence gathering process; indeed, one
that extends across temporally nested scales of analysis. The
existence of this process follows from, and only from, an adaptive
prior specifying the alignment of individuals’ mental states2.
Cooperative communication can thus be cast as a self-fulfilling
prophecy, driven by the belief that we are alike. This belief is
1Crucial to our account, in the active inference formulation ‘beliefs’ refer to
(subpersonal) Bayesian beliefs – in the sense of Bayesian belief updating or belief
propagation (as opposed to propositional beliefs).
2On a deflationary view, this is the only solution that can exist, in terms of
minimizing the surprise or free energy of coupled free energy minimizing agents.
See below and Friston et al. (2015a) for a fuller discussion in the context of pattern
formation.
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then characteristically reinforced by the evidence generated by
belief-guided communication.
Shweder and Sullivan (1993, p. 506) wrote that “cultural
psychology endeavors to understand how such divergences
[in the processes that underwrite consciousness] relate
to acts of interpretation and to the socially constructed
meaning or representation of stimulus events.” The present
article contributes to the project of cultural psychology and
neuroscience (e.g., Han, 2015; and articles in the present
collection) by explaining how a cultural milieu can shape and
direct the dynamics of individual minds; and, in turn, how
individual minds can shape their cultural milieu. We do this
by providing an account of sociocultural cognition based on
a shared adaptive prior for alignment, drawing on the active
inference formulation. In turn, we argue that how one’s cultural
experience manifests in any given time and place – the particular
tools one that uses in coming to grips with their world (i.e.,
words, gestures, and concepts) – is dependent on the history and
current contingencies of one’s culture and the minds, practices,
and places that make it up.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows.
In order for readers to appreciate the broader context that
underscores our proposal, we devote our second section to
a review of some of the key phenomena that underwrite
cooperative communication, as emphasized by other theorists
to date. In the third section, we introduce relevant aspects of
active inference, illustrated by examples drawn from studies of
cooperative communication. In the fourth section, we leverage
the background provided in the second and third sections to
argue that human species-typical adaptive priors prescribe the
alignment of one’s mental states with those of conspecifics.
This latter argument is presented in three subsections. The
first subsection focuses on real-time dynamics (i.e., interaction)
from the perspectives of an individual and dyad, respectively;
the second focuses on ontogeny; and the third focuses on the
timescale of cultural evolution. Our paper concludes with a
few comments about the limitations of the current proposal of
an adaptive prior for alignment. This is complemented with
suggested directions for future research.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Evolutionary Origins of Cooperative
Communication
Evolutionarily selected ‘mutual expectations of cooperativeness’
are thought to motivate the usage of cooperative communication
(Tomasello, 2014). From the perspective of evolutionary
biology, these expectations can be explained by considering
the selective contexts that favored them. One promising
candidate is so-called obligate collaborative foraging (Tomasello
et al., 2012), where adaptive success in securing food and
other resources is marked by a necessary dependence on
cooperation with others (also, Baumard et al., 2013). For
instance, in mutualistic ‘stag hunt’ games, a single individual
is necessary to obtain a low risk, but low reward, food item
(a hare), but two individuals are necessary to obtain a high
risk, but high reward, food item (a stag). Here, collaboration
appears as the riskier, but more rewarding, option3. It is riskier
because, to cooperate effectively, the would-be partners must
somehow align their mental states – their goals, intentions,
and attention (Skyrms, 2001). Cooperative communication
is thereby favored as a means to intentionally bring about
the alignment of mental states. For instance, in high risk
stag hunt scenarios preschool children communicated more,
and more often, relative to low risk situations (Duguid
et al., 2014). Such joint foraging scenarios may point
toward an important and recurrent aspect of the early
selective pressures that favored the motivations and skills
underlying cooperative communication (Tomasello, 2008; e.g.,
McLoone and Smead, 2014).
Research examining the communicative behavior of
extant non-human primates is crucial for understanding the
evolutionarily nascent form of modern humans’ communicative
motivations and skills (Call and Tomasello, 2007; Mitani, 2009).
Such work suggests that, generally speaking, the motivation and
skills of non-human primates for intentional communication
may have been gradually ‘cooperativized’ across human evolution
(Tomasello, 2014); that is, exapted for both cooperative and
competitive purposes with conspecifics. This trajectory may have
begun with the usage of gestural communication geared toward
simply eliciting specific responses from certain individuals
(Call and Tomasello, 2007). For instance, something like
ritualized great ape ‘attention grabbers’ – where an individual
has learned that (for a certain conspecific) an action like
slapping the ground loudly will likely bring about a desired
state of the world (e.g., the initiation of play; Tomasello,
2008) – may have been the evolutionary precursor to certain
manifestations of cooperative communication, like declarative
pointing (Tomasello, 2019). Indeed, the motivational component
is key (Rekers et al., 2011): human-raised non-human great
apes will occasionally point for humans (though never for
conspecifics). However, they only do this ‘selfishly,’ that is,
only when they expect the gesture to cause the individual
to (say) get an out-of-reach object for the ape (Bullinger
et al., 2011). In contrast, with cooperative communication,
the underlying motive is argued to be ‘fundamentally’
cooperative (Tomasello, 2019); that is, from the onset of
cooperative communication in ontogeny, human infants only
appear satisfied following a communicative bid when their
communicative partner has aligned their mental states with their
own, with respect to the infant’s intended referent (reviewed in
Carpenter and Liebal, 2011; for comparative considerations, see
Carpenter and Call, 2013).
The Developmental Origins of
Cooperative Communication
Human infants begin to use cooperative communication to
align and coordinate mental states at 9–12 months of age
(Carpenter et al., 1998). This window of emergence in ontogeny
3In the active inference formulation, below, collaboration is ‘rewarding’ in
the sense of maximizing a shared or prosocial utility (Yoshida et al., 2008;
Devaine et al., 2014).
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is strongly maturationally constrained (Matthews et al., 2012),
as evidenced by the emergence of communicative pointing
at this age in every cultural setting studied (Callaghan
et al., 2011; Liszkowski et al., 2012; Lieven and Stoll,
2013). One way this manifests initially is in declarative
pointing gestures directed toward referents in the immediate
environment. Experimental work suggests that the goal of
infants’ communication in such cases is to mutually align
emotions, attitudes, and/or thoughts about a referent with
another individual (Tomasello et al., 2007; e.g., Liszkowski
et al., 2007, 2009). Consistent with this, infants become
disgruntled when others ignore their communicative bids for
alignment. For instance, Liszkowski et al. (2004) found that
infants became unsatisfied with uncooperative adults who
ignored infants’ communicative bids, who did not provide an
emotional response symmetrical to the infant’s, and who did
not shift the focus of their attention back and forth between
the infant and their referent. This suggests that one aspect of
the desired state of the world that motivates infants’ earliest
communication simply is alignment with other agents’ mental
states (Tomasello et al., 2007).
This example illustrates a signal feature of cooperative
communication; namely, joint attention to a referent (Tomasello,
2008). There is substantial inconsistency in definitions of
joint attention within and across psychological subdisciplines
(Siposova and Carpenter, 2019). We follow the lead of Tomasello
and colleagues (e.g., Tomasello, 1995) by defining joint attention
as triadic situations in which two or more individuals possess
reliable evidence that all participants are attending to the same
referent, and that all participants know they are attending to the
same referent (i.e., ‘attending together’). This formulation of joint
attention – in terms of reliable evidence for the mutually inferred
alignment of attention (cf. mental states) – fits well with our
proposal, which mandates the gathering of reliable evidence for
the alignment of mental states.
The importance of joint attention for enabling cooperative
communication comes from the fact that joint attention enables,
and is enabled by, individuals’ capacity to reliably ‘ground’ their
communication in shared referents (Clark, 1996). Grounding
creates something called common ground (Clark and Brennan,
1991). Common ground is the set of mental states (knowledge,
beliefs, emotions, etc.) that is inferred to be reliably shared
with others (Clark, 1996; Gadamer, 2004; Tomasello, 2014). The
capacity to regulate communication with others by leveraging
joint attention and common ground is present from the onset
of cooperative communication (Tomasello et al., 2007). For
instance, young infants use their shared experience with a
particular person to interpret and produce utterances and
pointing gestures directed toward that individual (Tomasello and
Haberl, 2003; Ganea and Saylor, 2007; Saylor and Ganea, 2007;
Liebal et al., 2009, 2010).
Moreover, part of regulating communication with respect
to common ground is understanding, for instance, that one
must try to ‘fit’ their communication to the inferred needs
of another (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). As a simple
example of this kind of ‘perspectivizing’ (Verhagen, 2007) or
‘recipient design’ (Schegloff, 2006) process, consider that how
one chooses to talk about an artifact varies as a function of
the inferred amount of cultural common ground shared with
one’s interlocutor. In the presence of much cultural common
ground, a communicator might opt for brevity; and conversely,
in the presence of less cultural common ground, one might
use more precise (explicit, descriptive) language. For instance,
when conversing with someone from non-Western cultural
groups, one might employ the more cumbersome, longer
descriptive utterance “the jolly old man in a red suit who
gives presents to children” instead of the shorter proper name
“Santa Claus”. The upshot is that, in general, more common
ground means less communication is needed to align mental
states to a sufficient degree, and less common ground means
more communication is required (Tomasello, 2008). In other
words, the amount of information necessary to align mental
states to a degree adequate to enable cooperative behavior
within a given context is inversely proportional to the amount
of common ground.
This turns on an important point: the optimization of
relevance in cooperative communication (Sperber and
Wilson, 1986). Relevance refers to the complexity-accuracy
trade-off involved in the production and interpretation
of communication; e.g., the trade-off between simplicity
or compressibility, and meaningfulness or expressivity.
A useful way to think about how this trade-off is finessed is
in terms of communicative constructions (Goldberg, 2003).
Communicative constructions are patterned pairings of form
and meaning (e.g., word parts and order, intonation) whose
synchronic use and form are the result of diachronic patterns
of use and associated intergenerational transmission (e.g.,
processes of grammaticalization and reanalysis; Heine and
Kuteva, 2002; Bybee, 2010). Cooperative communicators use
communicative constructions to communicate (and thereby
align their mental states).
Optimizing relevance, for a speaker, therefore means using
the most minimal form that is expected to enable a listener to
recover (something sufficiently similar to) the intended meaning
(Kanwal et al., 2017); and for a listener, it means inferring
the most parsimonious meaning that sufficiently explains the
speaker’s intentions (Kao et al., 2014; see Goodman and Frank,
2016). This means, as above, that individuals sharing more
common ground require less form to adequately align mental
states, while those sharing less common ground require relatively
more form (Winters et al., 2018). Relatedly, simpler propositions
generally require less form to convey, and more complex
propositions require more form (Kemmer, 2003). Producing
and interpreting relevant communicative constructions thus
has implications across the communicative signal, which spans
from (e.g.) lexical selection and word order choice to the
sequencing of particular phonemes and intonation patterns
(Aylett and Turk, 2004).
Importantly, how might an individual recognize another’s
intention to generate an act of communication intended
‘for’ oneself in the first place (e.g., Behne et al., 2005)?
From another perspective, how might one make mutually
apparent one’s proximate motivation to align mental states,
that one is communicating ‘for’ another individual? To this
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end, researchers have proposed that ostensive cues (Sperber and
Wilson, 1986), like eye contact, spatiotemporal contingency,
and the communicative (e.g., vocal) signal itself, play an
important role in making mutually apparent an agent’s
intentions to communicate information intended to align
mental states (reviewed in Csibra, 2010; indeed, Tomasello,
2014, synonymously calls cooperative communication ‘ostensive-
inferential’ communication). Ostensive cues work by ‘grabbing’
the attention of others to redirect it triadically (i.e., toward
the intended referent) so as to comment on it (Szufnarowska
et al., 2014). Thus, via their modulatory effects on the
allocation of (joint) attention, ostensive cues play a critical
(if indirect) role in increasing individuals’ common ground
and enhancing the reliability of one’s inferences about this
common ground (e.g., Moll et al., 2007). This has important
downstream effects on subsequent behavior. For example,
communicative eye contact causes preschoolers to quickly
infer another’s desire to collaboratively play a stag hunt game
(Wyman et al., 2013; Siposova et al., 2018). Moreover, via
their effects on attention, ostensive cues play an important
role in guiding inductive inference and top-down categorization
processes throughout ontogeny (Butler and Tomasello, 2016;
Kovács et al., 2017).
Taking Stock
In sum, five key components characterizing cooperative
communication were noted in this section. Discussion of these
components structures much of the fourth section. First, great
apes do not characteristically employ communication geared
toward aligning mental states with conspecifics. Moreover,
something like the motivations and skills underlying the
communication of great apes likely served as a precursor
to the evolution of cooperative communication in humans.
Second, human communication is fueled by a motivation
to align and coordinate mental states with conspecifics.
This is a kind of mutual expectation of cooperativeness that
is manifest most basically in processes of joint attention,
which serves as a kind of ‘evolutionarily endowed’ common
ground that gets the process of communication ‘off the
ground’ in human ontogeny. Third, individuals using
cooperative communication optimize the relevance of
their communication, that is, the produced and inferred
expressiveness of the communicative signal with respect
to the production and processing costs of that signal. This
depends on the common ground shared by interlocutors,
such that, all else being equal, more common ground means
less communication and less common ground demands
more communication. Fourth, ostensive cues signal one’s
intention to communicate to another individual (and help
one to disambiguate another’s intention to communicate to
oneself). These are cues like eye contact, contingency, and the
speech signal itself.
Fifth and finally, it is useful to highlight that cooperative
communication typically manifests, particularly in early
ontogeny, as a circular or bidirectional flow of information
(note, e.g., the double-arrowed base of the canonical ‘joint
attentional triangle’; Carpenter and Liebal, 2011). Thus,
although we introduced cooperative communication by
focusing largely on individual imperatives, it is a fundamentally
collaborative process (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). The
usage of cooperative communication is a relevance-optimized
exchange of perspectives that manifests as a circular process
of ‘least collaborative effort’ (Clark and Brennan, 1991). This
characteristic circularity endows individuals with a single shared
narrative constituted by their individual perspectives and roles
in the collaborative exchange. Table 1 summarizes these points
along with several others introduced in the fourth section.
Implicit in the preceding discussion is the idea that it would
be surprising – that is, highly atypical – to find an adult human
without a communicative system that they could employ to align
their mental states with those of others. In this sense, the usage of
cooperative communication is a predictable, or expected, aspect
that characterizes part of the human phenotype. A question one
might ask is, How does this expectation over species-typical states
(i.e., this aspect of the phenotype) persist, robustly, across time
and (action in) a fluctuating niche?
TABLE 1 | Summary of key features circumscribing cooperative communication.
Scale of analysis Characteristic dynamics and processes of cooperative communication
Real-time (mechanism) • Ostension
• Joint attention
• Relevance optimization
• Coupled, bidirectional flow of information
• Proximate motivation to align and coordinate mental states (e.g., declarative, interrogative, and informative motives)
Development (ontogeny) • Clearest behavioral onset at ∼9–12 months of age (i.e., cooperative pointing)
• Gradual alignment with a conventionalized communicative system
Cultural evolution (phylogeny) • Historical development of a communicative system (e.g., grammaticalization, syntactic reanalysis, and semantic bleaching)
• Diversification of communicative systems across time, space, and speaker communities
Biological evolution (adaptation) • ‘Cooperativization’ of non-human great ape communicative motives and skills (e.g., non-human ape attention getters as
precursor to human declarative pointing)
• Ultimate motivation to align and coordinate mental states (i.e., mutual expectations of cooperativeness)
Certain features, e.g., alignment with a communicative system, are discussed in the fourth section. This paper associates these phenomena with the corresponding scale
of dynamics underwritten by the free-energy formulation and, more substantively, the hierarchically mechanistic mind (see Figure 4 in Badcock et al., 2019a).
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ACTIVE INFERENCE
Active inference is a theory of belief-guided adaptive action
(Friston et al., 2017a). It is a mathematical framework that
models the processes by which organisms and their niche come
to ‘fit’ or become ‘attuned’ to each other (for an introduction
to the mathematical apparatus of active inference, see Bogacz,
2017; Buckley et al., 2017). In other words, active inference
describes the manner in which organisms and their environments
come to possess statistical properties that are predictable from
each other (Bruineberg et al., 2018b; Constant et al., 2018).
On this view, organisms come to embody statistical models of
their ecological niche via perception and learning, and both
cultural and natural selection (i.e., empirical and adaptive priors,
respectively). Reciprocally, organisms modify their niche to fit
their prior beliefs via adaptive action and niche construction.
As detailed in Figure 1, the models in this formulation are
‘generative models’ that recapitulate the causal independencies
between the factors that generate their sensory input (i.e., how
the niche causes their sensory data; e.g., Hinton, 2007; LeCun
et al., 2015). In active inference, organisms are, roughly speaking,
normative models of what ought to be the case, given ‘the kind of
creature that I am’ (Friston, 2011).
The main theoretical suggestion of this paper is that human
individuals appear, characteristically (i.e., species-typically), to
be endowed with an adaptive prior that one’s mental states are
aligned with those of conspecifics. Now, for human agents, the
mental states of other agents are unobservable or ‘hidden’ states
that need to be inferred on the basis of perceptual cues (e.g.,
gaze direction, posture, facial expression). In other words, mental
state alignment is an inference problem: to align with others,
an agent must infer the latent or hidden causes (i.e., mental
states) that generate observable consequences (i.e., actions).
Thus, for agents whose niche includes the mental states of
other agents, the set of actions that resolve uncertainty about
the niche must comprise actions that reliably disambiguate
others’ mental states4. We suggest that this is precisely the
situation brought about by the presence of an adaptive prior
for alignment. This adaptive prior fosters specific, patterned
forms of (communicative) action and inference that are aimed
at disambiguating the mental states of other agents. The
characteristic result of this process is the alignment of mental
states between conspecifics. The alignment process enables
and maintains reliable hypotheses about shared narratives that
contextualize our experience (Friston and Frith, 2015a).
Active Inference, Adaptive Priors, and
Alignment
In active inference, actions are generated by hierarchically
organized policies (beliefs about action). The policy pursued by
4This is described anthropomorphically, as though individuals are explicitly
engaged in an inference like ‘I want to attune the statistics of our brains.’ Clearly,
this is not the case. Rather, this language is used for expository purposes. Indeed,
this descriptive tendency is essentially the same as that used by, e.g., Tomasello
(2019), where talk of humans’ ultimate motivation to align and coordinate mental
states often surfaces in place of proximate instantiations thereof. We thank L. Li
(personal communication, December, 2018) for noting this ambiguity.
an organism at a particular time is the one that minimizes
an information-theoretic variational free energy term (Friston
et al., 2015b; for a review of variational inference, see Blei et al.,
2017). Roughly speaking, free energy quantifies the discrepancy
between what an agent expects or prefers to sense and what it
actually senses. This conception of free energy is closely related
to prediction error (i.e., the mismatch between predicted and
observed sensations; Clark, 2013). A complementary view of free
energy is that it scores the (negative log) evidence for the internal
model generating predictions, in the sense that sensory data that
conform to predictions provide evidence for the veracity of the
agent’s generative model. In short, minimizing free energy is the
same as soliciting sensory evidence for one’s model of the world
(sometimes known as ‘self-evidencing’; Hohwy, 2016). On this
view, we are our own existence proofs.
The free energy expected under a policy tracks the probability
of that particular policy being pursued (i.e., of that specific
policy being selected to guide action). Relatively less expected
free energy indicates a relatively more probable policy (Friston
et al., 2015b; Pezzulo et al., 2018; relatedly, Cisek, 2007). Expected
free energy can be decomposed into two terms: epistemic value
(the information gain of an observation), and pragmatic value
(the expected log evidence of some outcome, given a generative
model of how outcomes depend on action). The relative influence
of each term quantifies the degree to which a particular policy
generates actions that explore the niche (i.e., exploration), or
actions that leverage reliable expectations about the niche to
secure preferred outcomes5 (i.e., exploitation) (Friston et al.,
2015b). This is depicted in Figure 16.
Salient policies are those that have a high epistemic value
or affordance (Parr and Friston, 2017). These energize actions
that enable an agent to learn the statistical regularities of its
environment (see caption, Figure 1). This, in turn, enables
pragmatic imperatives to foster actions that capitalize on
learned regularities (Friston et al., 2015b). For example, repeated
exposure to the sensory phenomena characteristic of their
culture’s communicative constructions leads infants to become
familiar with the statistical properties of those constructions
(Romberg and Saffran, 2010). In turn, increasingly precise
expectations about hidden causes may lead infants to prefer
gathering information from speakers of their native language
relative to speakers of a foreign language (e.g., Begus et al.,
2016; Marno et al., 2016). This is predicted by the hypothesis
that agents exploit their familiarity with the sensory phenomena
characteristic of their culture’s communicative constructions
5These outcomes are a priori preferred because they are the least surprising ones;
i.e., outcomes that ‘a creature like me’ would expect to encounter.
6A mathematically equivalent but complementary division of expected free energy
is into ambiguity and risk. Ambiguity is the expected uncertainty about outcomes
given some state in the future, while risk is the divergence between anticipated
and preferred outcomes. Interestingly, risk is also the expected complexity cost
found in statistics. This means that minimizing expected free energy – by selecting
the right kind of policies – implicitly minimizes the complexity cost of inference.
This is exactly the imperative established in the previous section; namely to find
‘common ground’ that minimizes communication cost. This particular perspective
can be traced back to the foundational principles of universal computation, where
variational free energy is often discussed in terms of minimum description or
message lengths. See MacKay (1995), Wallace and Dowe (1999), and Schmidhuber
(2010) for more discussion.
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FIGURE 1 | Active inference. This Figure schematizes active inference. It depicts the coupling of an agent’s internal states (the dynamics of which entail predictions
or beliefs about the niche, µ) to its external states (the dynamics of the agent’s niche, η). Middle Panel: The influence of the niche on the agent is given by the
dynamics of the agent’s sensations, s. Reciprocally, the influence of the agent upon its niche is given by the agent’s action, a, upon the niche. This means that the
niche is not directly observable from the perspective of an agent’s internal states; and the agent’s internal states are not directly observable from the perspective of
the niche. From an agent’s perspective, the niche is thus described as a set of hidden variables. Hidden variables must be inferred (i.e., predicted) from sensory
observations. Thus, to minimize the probability of sampling surprising sensory states, the task for the agent is to attune the dynamics of internal states to those of
the niche; or attune the dynamics of the niche to those of internal states. Attunement renders the agent an approximate (predictive) model of the hidden causes of its
sensations. We can quantify the degree of attunement between organism and niche with a quantity called variational free energy (Bruineberg et al., 2018a; Constant
et al., 2018). Free energy F bounds (i.e., is greater or equal to) the surprisal –lnp(s) associated with a sensation (Friston, 2010). Importantly, free energy is a function
of two quantities to which the organism has access, namely, its sensations and predictions (for discussion, see Bruineberg et al., 2018a). Lower Panel: The bottom
right details how perception optimizes free energy by implicitly minimizing a Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence term D. The KL divergence tracks the statistical
similarity of two distributions (Cover and Thomas, 1991); e.g., the similarity of prior beliefs about the state of the niche with posterior beliefs (Friston, 2012). Because
the KL divergence provides an upper bound on surprisal, minimizing it renders the agent a model of the niche and thus implicitly bounds the surprise of sensory
states. Upper Panel: These expressions define the relationship of the niche to the agent. Note the kind of ‘mirror image’ relationship between the equations in the
(upper panel) with the equations in the lower. This relationship is a consequence of the mathematics of free energy minimization (see Bruineberg et al., 2018b;
Constant et al., 2018). It means that the niche ‘sees’ and ‘learns’ about the agent (i.e., via the agent’s action) in the same way an agent sees and learns about their
niche (i.e., via the niche’s ‘action’). This insight is extended in Figure 2. Adapted with permission from Veissière et al. (forthcoming).
to guide attention toward sensory stimuli that is expected
to be useful for disambiguating the mental states of others
(Figures 1, 2).
In active inference, the folk-psychological term ‘attention’
refers to two distinct, but closely related, phenomena; namely,
epistemic value and precision weighting (Parr and Friston, 2017).
Epistemic value, salience, or affordance is the component of
policy selection just discussed; it is that component of the value
of policies that tracks how much a policy reduces uncertainty
about the state of the world (e.g., Friston et al., 2012). It
provides a description of the folk-psychological phenomenon of
actively orienting toward or ‘turning one’s attention’ to a certain
modality or part of the sensory field (e.g., in visual saccades that
sample a particular location in visual space). In short, salience
or epistemic affordance is an attribute of how we sample the
world – in the sense that actively sampling sensory information
will reduce uncertainty, in relation to our current beliefs. In
contrast, precision is an attribute of the sensory data per se.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 417
fpsyg-11-00417 March 23, 2020 Time: 20:10 # 8
Vasil et al. Human Communication as Active Inference
FIGURE 2 | Thinking through other minds. This Figure depicts a set of heuristic equations that describe the kind of free energy minimization hypothesized to
underwrite the acquisition and production of learned cultural behaviors via the coupled dynamics sketched in the main text (full equations in Figure 1). In the context
of human communication, coupled dynamics are energized by an adaptive prior for alignment. The adaptive prior for alignment specifies the characteristically
enhanced precision of the hypothesis that ‘we’ exist. This prior motivates similar agents to actively couple their respective actions an and sensations sn. Via the
processes discussed in the main text, this statistical coupling of sensation and action enables each individual to reliably align with (i.e., infer) the hidden states µn of
conspecific n. This circular process brings about a process of cultural niche construction that creates, maintains, and modifies a set of predictable epistemic (i.e.,
deontic) resources, η. These specify a set of high value (i.e., predictable) observation-policy mappings, which are used to disambiguate the mental states of
conspecifics (Veissière et al., forthcoming). One important class of deontic resource is the set of observation-policy mappings that underwrite a system of
communicative constructions (i.e., form-meaning pairings). This means that the use of communicative constructions plays a critical role in enabling agents with an
adaptive prior for alignment to effectively disambiguate external states. This is because an agent’s external states are constituted, in part, by the internal, mental
states of another agent (and vice versa). This follows from the fact that external states cause sensation; for an agent equipped with an adaptive prior for alignment,
inferring the motion of external states entails inferring other agents’ hidden states. The production and observation of communicative constructions is useful because
it effectively and flexibly guides ‘regimes’ of attention that enable species unique forms of cultural learning (see Ramstead et al., 2016; Veissière et al., forthcoming).
Diachronically, communicative constructions are finessed by a community of agents via the inheritance and (intended or unintended) modification of constructions
during either learning or usage. Adapted with permission from Veissière et al. (forthcoming).
Imprecise sensory data should have less effect on (Bayesian)
belief updating, relative to precise information. It is therefore
important to afford the right precision to each sensory sample,
via precision weighting.
Precision-weighing is the related (but distinct) attentional
process that determines the relative influence of bottom-up error
signals and top-down expectations in the brain; e.g., a high
precision on sensory signals corresponds to low confidence in
top-down beliefs (Clark, 2013; Powers et al., 2016). That is,
in the sense of precision-weighting, ‘attention’ refers to the
optimization of the precision (inverse variance) of prior beliefs
about the causes of sensory data, relative to the precision of
those data; in other words, attentional selection is in the game
of selecting the right sort of sensory information for belief
updating. This precision weighting in the brain is thought to
be mediated by the modulation of neuronal gain (Kanai et al.,
2015). Precise (attended, ascending) error signals then serve to
modulate action and direct what is learned (Feldman and Friston,
2010; Adams et al., 2013). The complement of this attentional
selection is the attenuation of precision; known in psychophysics
as sensory attenuation; i.e., attending away from or ignoring
certain sensations; particularly those we cause ourselves.
Crucially, selective attention and attenuation of precision can
be part of the covert (mental) actions that are entailed by a
policy. In other words, when selecting the policy that minimizes
expected free energy we are also committing to both overt action
on the (embodied) world – through moving, blushing, speaking
etc. – and a covert attentional set. We will now illustrate these
aspects (orienting to salient stimuli and attentional selection) of
active inference with two examples.
As a first example, in the case of human communication,
orienting to salient sensory streams should enhance the ability to
learn the causes (i.e., mental states) generating sensory evidence
by making beliefs about mental states generating that stream
more probable. With this in mind, note that one common
motivation for infants’ and young children’s communication is
quintessentially uncertainty resolving and ‘interrogative’ (Begus
and Southgate, 2012; Harris et al., 2017). For instance, infants’
pointing can function as a request for information about
the name or function of objects (Begus and Southgate, 2012;
Kovács et al., 2014). It is thus interesting that, in line with
the present account, orienting to (the sensory effects of) one’s
communicative bids enhances learning of (e.g.) communicative
constructions and object functions (Begus et al., 2014; Lucca
and Wilbourn, 2018a,b; see Friston and Frith, 2015a). In short,
infants evince sophisticated policies for resolving uncertainty
and creating opportunities for epistemic foraging. In turn,
attending to and learning the causes of the communicative
stream then enables policies to exploit prior beliefs about
how such sensations were caused; that is, inferring whether
or not we are aligned, based on the evidence generated
through our interactions (e.g., in using learned constructions
to ask, explicitly, ‘Do you understand?’). This brings us to
our second example.
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For agents who expect their predictions to be fulfilled,
individuals who do not provide evidence for this expectation –
despite one’s attempts to actively attune mental states –
should come to be treated as imprecise sources of sensory
information, relative to others that fulfill their expected ‘role’
in the evidence gathering process; i.e., others that are afforded
epistemic trust (Fonagy and Allison, 2014). In other words, in
a given communicative interaction, salient policies are those
that are expected to be useful with respect to the alignment of
mental states; e.g., in certain instances of conversational repair
(Schegloff et al., 1977). Across interactions with specific others,
repeatedly experiencing surprising responses (i.e., insufficient
evidence for, or evidence against, alignment) means that selective
attention toward those specific others comes to be afforded
low precision (i.e., ignored). Subsequently, action should lead
the appearance, on average across time, of avoiding such
unreliable parts of the niche (Constant et al., 2018) – much
as we tend to avoid the dark when searching for something
(Demirdjian et al., 2005).
We suggest that this provides an explanation of the findings
by Liszkowski et al. (2004), discussed above, which reported
that 12-month-old were dissatisfied with an uncooperative adult
who failed to provide both look-backs between the infant and
their intended referent and the same emotional response as
the infant in response to the infant’s communicative bids.
On our view, infants were attempting a kind of fast ‘error
correction’ by generating actions expected to minimize exposure
to unexpected cues (i.e., allostatic control; see Pezzulo et al.,
2015). This occurred via a rapid increase in the salience of
policies that generate pointing behavior when sampling sensory
data that was inconsistent with infants’ prior beliefs about
alignment. Moreover, only the group of infants who attempted to
communicate with an uncooperative adult pointed significantly
less across trials; through the lens of active inference, they had
revised their expectations about the sensory effects of action,
leading them to select other policies.
This second example suggests that, within and across trials
of the experiment, infants appeared to climb an evidence
gradient for their expectations. That is, repeated orienting to cues
indicative of the (dis)alignment of prior beliefs – despite allostatic
control geared toward avoiding such surprising encounters –
caused infants to infer and learn that their interaction partner was
unhelpful with regards to gathering evidence for their (species-
typical) prior beliefs. For the infant, orienting to the sensory
consequences of repeated failed attempts to elicit evidence
from the adult indicative of alignment (e.g., look-backs and
symmetrical emotions) had an impact on the expected free energy
of policies. In particular, policies geared toward inferring the
prior beliefs of the uncooperative adult came to be characterized
by a relatively high expected free energy. Consequently, such
policies became relatively unlikely to gain control over action; i.e.,
less communication with that adult.
In sum, by suggesting that humans are characterized by
an adaptive prior for alignment, we effectively argue that
policies expected to disambiguate others’ mental states are
characterized by a low expected free energy. This is by
virtue of their high epistemic affordance (i.e., in a niche
partly constituted by others’ mental states). Consequently, these
policies tend to dominate action – people tend to gesticulate
and talk with others. Repeatedly leveraging this belief to
guide context-sensitive patterns of action, in turn, enables
agents to learn the structure and dynamics of their niche.
Because the human niche includes others’ mental states, beliefs
about how to act to effectively infer and align with others
will have high adaptive value (Constant et al., forthcoming).
This means that learning likely entails refining one’s set of
‘communicative policies’ to approximate the set of policies
expected (i.e., typically used) in one’s cultural milieu. In short,
leveraging communicative constructions means converging on
the mutually inferred, or deontic, value of policies geared toward
disambiguating mental states among agents equipped with an
adaptive prior for alignment.
Deontic Value: Shared Expectations
About the Value of Policies
Above we assumed that the prior beliefs of conspecifics had
converged on the set of constructions leveraged in their cultural
niche. This assumption is important, as our argument considers
the acquisition and (cultural) evolution of communicative
constructions (below). Within active inference, the concept
of shared or deontic value – and associated deontic cues –
(Constant et al., 2018, 2019) may be useful for understanding
the emergence of cooperative communication in ontogeny and
cultural evolution.
The deontic value of a policy rests on a direct (‘automatized’)
likelihood mapping between learned cues and associated action
policies. The mapping from deontic cue to policy is ‘direct’
in the sense that observation of a deontic cue comes to
‘automatically’ elicit an associated (i.e., learned) policy7. Deontic
cues are observations that trigger such automatic, or habitual,
policy selection (Constant et al., 2019). Encultured agents learn
deontic observation-policy mappings in development, through
their engagement with the deontic cues that populate their
local cultural niche (e.g., Chukoskie et al., 2013). By ‘offloading’
cognition into the environment in this way (see Clark, 2006,
2008), the direct mapping enables individuals to bypass costly
updates to, and metabolic upkeep of, their beliefs about what
to do (given what is inferred of the niche). This allows
agents to rely directly on deontic cues to select the most
appropriate policy (Constant et al., 2018). There is clearly a
close relationship between deontic cues, semiotics, and signs
(Sewell, 1992; Goodwin, 2000) that underwrite communication.
Perhaps the most celebrated system of encultured deontic cues is
language itself.
For instance, consider an individual who has learned the
English construction ‘let alone’ (Fillmore et al., 1988); that is,
a communicative construction marked by a comparative ‘let
alone’ phrase centered between clause X and clause (fragment)
7Technically, expected free energy is combined with deontic value to score the
likelihood of a particular policy. In the absence of deontic value, the expected free
energy will select the most apt epistemic and goal directed policy, given beliefs
about the current state of the world. Conversely, if certain cues render the deontic
value of a policy sufficiently high, it will dominate policy selection – and emerge as
a habit.
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Y; e.g., ‘I could barely run 1 mile let alone 4 miles.’ Learning
the ‘let alone’ construction, as one example of a more general
phenomenon (see subsection “Dynamics at the Timescale of
Ontogeny”), entails learning the deontic value of cues (for
policies that parse spoken or written language). In short, if
I hear you utter the phrase ‘X’ and possess prior, reliably
shared knowledge of the construction ‘X let alone Y,’ then I
can reliably expect you to follow up with ‘let alone Y.’ This
example assumes a probabilistic (generative) model of how
communicative sensations are caused (e.g., a scheme to reliably
parse syntax; Levy, 2008; reviewed in Kuperberg and Jaeger,
2016). In particular, this turns on the acquisition of the deontic
value of linguistic policies entailed by the hypothesis that one is
witnessing a ‘let alone’ construction.
But how do such reliable mappings come to exist in the
first place? That is, how do communicative constructions ‘build
up’ over (neurodevelopmental or evolutionary) time? Consider
a simple example: continually walking along the same path
across a park each day wears down the grass along that path
(Constant et al., 2018). As the grass wears down and a clear
path forms, one learns to expect the associated sensory cues
when revisiting the path. Because of this, the path becomes
increasingly salient for both oneself and for others ‘like me,’
who can (like me) leverage such ‘meaningful’ traces left by
my actions at later time points. Consequently, the cognitive
processing associated with answering the question ‘Where ought
I to walk next’ is afforded directly by physical features of the
niche. This saves on the costs associated with planning as
active inference (Attias, 2003; Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012;
Baker and Tenenbaum, 2014; Mirza et al., 2016) – the inference
is literally ‘offloaded’ into the environment (see equations in
Figures 1, 2). The niche provides a clue as to what to do, reliably,
as a deontic cue.
Crucially, when this process of ‘carving out’ deontic cues
in the niche is performed by an increasing number of agents,
the deontic value of policies and associated cues becomes
increasingly robust to perturbations. In other words, the
expectations of the social niche – here, the set of form-
meaning pairings constituting a communicative system – become
increasingly precise with increases in the number of interactions
between agents constituting that system (Constant et al., 2019).
Increasingly precise, niche-based expectations mean that agents
become more likely to sensitize their behavior to that cue; e.g.,
the dynamics of a cue become sufficiently precise so as to enable
learning of that cue and its associated action policy in ontogeny
(below). In multi-agent systems equipped with an adaptive prior
to align mental states, learning of deontic value (i.e., inferring
the most common policies undertaken by other denizens of the
niche) is learning the ‘shared’ value of a policy – the value of a
policy for people ‘like me’ in our community (Figure 2).
What might it mean to offload cognition into the environment
in the fashion above, for agents equipped with an adaptive
prior to attune mental states? Individuals effectively outsource
solutions to the problem of ‘How ought I to talk’ to the
niche itself. The traces left by repeatedly aligning mental states
via communication may enable the niche to subsequently
afford increasingly precise, shared expectations about how
other agents ‘like me’ (should) act so as to align mental
states most effectively (e.g., during evolutionarily relevant stag
hunt scenarios; Grau-Moya et al., 2013). In principle, this
takes pressure off inferring ‘what sort of person am I in this
context’ (Moutoussis et al., 2014). Technically, it finesses the
computational cost of belief updating from (deontically installed)
priors to posterior beliefs about behaviors that are apt for the
current setting. Consequently, the cue (or sequence of cues) may
come to be preferred by both individuals during subsequent
interactions in similar contexts (Schelling, 1960; Lewis, 1969;
e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Formally speaking, at later
instances of interaction, the expected free energy of historically
selected policies – leveraged to align mental states – falls;
such policies then tend to be selected to generate predictable
action sequences geared toward the alignment of mental states
(Friston and Frith, 2015b).
HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS ACTIVE
INFERENCE
This section provides a discussion of our proposal. The species-
typical motivation to align mental states with conspecifics is cast
as an adaptive prior preference for alignment. This, we suggest,
provides the basis for a normative framework for predicting,
explaining, and modeling the behavioral, psychological, and
neural underpinnings of cooperative communication. Our
discussion in this section telescopes from considerations at the
microscale (i.e., mechanism), to the mesoscale (i.e., ontogeny),
and, finally, to the macroscale (i.e., cultural evolution).
Dynamics at the Timescale of
Mechanism: The Individual in Context
A central part of the content of the prior for alignment is that the
actions of agents (e.g., oneself) update the mental states (prior
beliefs) of other agents. Because mental states cause action (and,
hence, observations), gathering reliable evidence for this prior
means that agents orient to the individual(s) toward whom their
action is directed – the sensory consequences of one’s action
are realized by the actions of others. That is, if one expects to
infer others’ mental states, the only evidence available is found
in the observed consequences of others’ actions (Figure 3).
Indeed, policies that direct action toward others – so as to
disambiguate their mental states (e.g., attentional orienting and,
later, cooperative pointing) – possess an evolutionarily unique
(Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003), maturationally constrained salience
from early in life (Reddy, 2003; Matthews et al., 2012). Gathering
evidence for these expectations manifests in coupled action-
perception cycles (Friston and Frith, 2015a); i.e., intentionally
co-constructed loops of action-perception that induce a reliable
statistical coupling between two coupled agents (reviewed in, e.g.,
Hasson et al., 2012; Feldman, 2015; Hasson and Frith, 2016).
For expository purposes, we may say that, within the coupled
action-perception cycle of human agents, evidence for the self
amounts to evidence for the other; and evidence for the other is
evidence for the self.
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FIGURE 3 | One canonical ‘loop’ of the coupled action-perception cycle. This
example is ‘canonical’ in the sense that the manifestation of the coupled
action-perception cycle in a given instance may vary as a function of context
and the experience of its constituent members (e.g., an infant’s
communicative needs with an adult are different than a pair of adults’). With
this in mind, for two agents A and B expecting to reliably infer each other’s
mental states, the beliefs of A (‘my idea’) generate A’s observable actions (‘my
behavior’). The actions of A, in turn, cause the (attended) sensory states of B.
Attention directed toward agent A by agent B in turn enables the observations
generated by A to entrain the hidden states of B (‘your version of my idea’).
This is just some hypothesis entertained by B about the causes of B’s
observations (i.e., about the mental states generating A’s actions). To increase
or maintain the reliability of B’s hypothesis, B must then act on the niche (‘your
behavior’) to test B’s hypothesis about hidden causes, as it were (that is, to
check for mutual understanding, for instance; e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986). B thereby causes A’s attended observations and, hence, A’s mental
states (‘my version of your idea’). This looping dynamics continues until both
agents infer alignment (Friston and Frith, 2015a). Central here is that A is
attending to the sensory states generated by B (and vice versa) because the
only way to gather evidence for the adaptive prior that mental states are
aligned is to attend to the sensory effects of one’s actions; and evidence for
hypotheses about the sensory effects of one’s actions can only be given (in
the present context) by the actions of the other agent. Working backwards,
because the actions of another agent are generated by their mental states;
and their mental states are entrained by (attended) sensory observations; and
their sensory observations are generated by one’s own actions; we thus arrive
at the claim, given at the start of this section, that “A central part of the
content of the prior belief prescribing the alignment of mental states among
conspecifics is that the actions of agents (e.g., oneself) modulate the mental
states (prior beliefs) of other agents.” Adapted with permission from Friston
and Frith (2015a).
Above, we discussed how mutual expectations of
cooperativeness play a crucial role in getting cooperative
communication off the ground in ontogeny. This just means
that the (epigenetically and neurodevelopmentally) constrained,
precise beliefs about the similarity of others and oneself enable
nascent individuals to engage in cooperative communication.
In particular, such couplings are only possible because both
agents possess reliable expectations that the other agent is
sufficiently ‘like me’ (cf. Meltzoff, 2007): we share the same
prior beliefs to attune hidden dynamics. This provides an
initial ‘naive’ confidence in beliefs about how one’s action will
influence another’s prior beliefs (that, in turn, influence sensory
outcomes via their actions). Borrowing from the language of
social constructivist views of development (e.g., Rhodes and
Wellman, 2017), our prior is a kind of naive certainty in one’s
intuitive theory about agential efficacy, with respect to the
mental states of others (see also Kelso, 2016). This is to say
that prior beliefs about the niche, e.g., others’ mental states,
bottom out just in their expected free energy. Belief-guided
action (e.g., collaboration) may thus be constrained by salient
policies entailed by a prior belief that, psychologically speaking,
some hypothesis is in common ground. Put simply, to the
extent that this hypothesis is sufficiently reliable, it will guide
action and inference (see Figure 3 and, e.g., Yoshida et al., 2008;
Gallagher and Allen, 2018).
Pursuing this line of reasoning further provides a single,
formally specified framework to subsume distinct proximate
motivations for communication. That is, proximate motivations
for communication (e.g., declarative, expressive, informative,
interrogative motives; Begus and Southgate, 2012; Tomasello,
2019) surface as particular psychological manifestations of the
same, species-typical tendency to align prior beliefs. Consider
two proximate motivations for communication noted above;
namely, a ‘declarative’ one motivated by the desired alignment
of attentional states; and an ‘interrogative’ one motivated by a
desire to learn about the niche. In the former case, individuals
exploit their reliably shared beliefs to render the niche sufficiently
similar to themselves (e.g., ‘By ostensively pointing for that other
agent, I expect to effectively align our mental states with respect
to my intended referent’); and in the latter, individuals explore the
precise, reliable parts of the niche (here, other agents) to improve
their internal model of the niche (e.g., ‘What is this thing called?’;
reviewed in Harris and Corriveau, 2011; Harris et al., 2017). The
underlying commonality in both cases is that individuals are
effectively generating action-perception cycles that couple them
to others, with the result being the alignment of mental states with
respect to the niche.
Moving now to relevance optimization, we remind the reader
that this process involves finessing the trade-off between the
accuracy (e.g., meaningfulness, expressivity) and complexity (e.g.,
minimum description length, hierarchical depth of the policy)
of their communicative constructions. Under active inference
(see Pezzulo et al., 2013), if the prior beliefs of two individuals
are inferred to be highly divergent on the basis of the evidence
each provides to the other, and if both expect to minimize this
divergence to a sufficient degree, then costlier (e.g., hierarchically
deeper or more complex) policies should become relatively
more salient as agents become increasingly dissimilar, as these
policies will be necessary to resolve uncertainty or disambiguate
the mental state of inscrutable others. This is in contrast
to two individuals who ‘speak the same language’. Here, less
information needs to flow within the coupled action-perception
cycle to attune mental states to a similar degree. In support
of this view, one study (Kanwal et al., 2017) found that adults
optimize the relevance of their communicative constructions
during collaborative tasks as a function of their common ground,
by using shorter words for common objects and longer words
for uncommon objects (see also Winters et al., 2018). Related
work suggests that children’s adjective use (Bannard et al., 2017),
turn-taking dynamics (Butko and Movellan, 2010), and question
asking (Nelson et al., 2014) may be usefully cast as if they were
optimizing the information content of produced communicative
constructions with respect to processing and energy concerns
(cf. Pea, 1979).
For a receiver, attention to the communicative stream
enables updates to one’s beliefs by providing ‘contextual
effects’ (Sperber and Wilson, 1987); that is, orienting to a
speaker influences the precision of hypotheses (about, e.g., the
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interpretation of an utterance) through appropriate selection of
ascending sensory information (indexed neurophysiologically
by alpha suppression; Höhl et al., 2014; and increased theta;
Begus et al., 2016; Köster et al., 2019). Specifically, individuals
appear to explain away incoming sensory data by zeroing
in on informative (useful) but parsimonious (i.e., efficient)
explanations of hidden causes (Goodman and Frank, 2016;
see also Gershman et al., 2015). For instance, Frank and
Goodman (2014) report that adult and child listeners
disambiguate ambiguous word meanings by optimizing
their inferences of the relevance of a speaker’s intended
meaning8. In particular, these inferences can be captured
as if individuals were maximizing model evidence for the
prior belief that speakers are informative (see also Kao
et al., 2014). This is captured by our extended formulation
of cooperative communication, where inferences about
mental states can be cast in terms of maximizing Bayesian
model evidence (i.e., minimizing variational free energy) for
the causes of one’s sensation (e.g., another’s mental states;
Friston and Frith, 2015a).
Given an adaptive prior for alignment, one should tend
to favor policies expected to reliably generate evidence of
engagement in a coupled action-perception cycle. That is,
such ostensive policies – policies expected to generate ostensive
cues – are adaptive because they tend to generate sensory
evidence for the hypothesis that one is engaged in a coupled
action-perception cycle. Ostensive policies indicate to one’s
communicative partner that attending to one’s action (i.e., to the
individual generating ostensive cues) will likely be informative
for them. Consequently, for a recipient, evidence provided
by such cues increases the salience of certain policies; e.g.,
attentional orienting geared toward disambiguating the speaker’s
prior beliefs (Szufnarowska et al., 2014). As attention optimizes
the precision of sensory cues, ostension in the coupled action-
perception cycle plays a crucial (if indirect) role in reliably
entraining and shaping prior beliefs (Axelsson et al., 2012; Butler
and Tomasello, 2016; Kovács et al., 2017). Since prior beliefs
generate action, ostensive cues are thus critical for guiding other
individuals’ actions and hence one’s (attended) sensory states
(e.g., Siposova et al., 2018).
By the same logic, in response to ostensive cues a recipient
should (ostensively) signal their own inferred entrance into a
communicative coupling (e.g., uptake signals; Austin, 1962); as
well as, for example, their subjective degree of (and certainty
in) the attunement of mental states (e.g., backchannel signals;
Clark and Brennan, 1991). Indeed, other individuals – inferred
to possess the same adaptive prior for alignment – preferentially
leverage cooperative communication in turn; that is, respond to
one’s communicative bids (Kishimoto et al., 2007; Wu and Gros-
Louis, 2015). This makes sense in light of the adaptive prior
8Interestingly, in machine learning, automatic relevance determination is a term
used to denote model selection based upon variational free energy; namely,
the removal of redundant model parameters to maximize efficiency or Bayesian
model evidence. In turn, this is closely related to principles of minimum
redundancy and maximum efficiency in perception (Barlow, 1974; Linsker, 1990;
Wipf and Rao, 2007).
specified here: responding to another’s communicative bids is
something in the interest of both agents9.
In summary, this subsection provided an active
inference account of the microscale features of cooperative
communication, from an individual’s perspective, noted in the
second section. We have thus outlined some important means
by which individuals intentionally align their prior beliefs with
respect to the dynamics of the niche (Constant et al., 2018),
including others’ mental states (Friston and Frith, 2015a).
Indeed, a foundational facet of our account is that the alignment
of the mental states of conspecifics manifests in the emergence
of a novel scale of social and cultural dynamics constituted by
synchronized component individuals (Ramstead et al., 2018).
We turn to this now.
Dynamics at the Timescale of
Mechanism: The Dyad
The precision of one’s prior beliefs relative to another agent’s,
with whom one is coupled, has important implications for
the degree and direction of attunement within and across
couplings. In particular, the relative precision of the prior
beliefs of each agent constrains the characteristic pattern of
information flow between them – both at the level of turn
taking in dialogical exchanges, and at the level of learning
useful generative models of others10 (and implicitly, of the self)
(Friston and Frith, 2015a,b; Gencaga et al., 2015; e.g., Schippers
et al., 2010). In terms of learning, this means that individuals
endowed with relatively imprecise prior beliefs tend more, on
average across time, to modify their own structure to fit that
of their communicative partner(s), relative to individuals with
relatively precise priors. This is a special case of generalized
synchronization that is underwritten by the enslaving principle
from cybernetics (Tschacher and Haken, 2007). To attune prior
beliefs in such ‘asymmetric’ couplings, individuals with imprecise
expectations in effect increase the precision of their sensory states
(i.e., ‘up the gain’ afforded to sensory input; Moran et al., 2013;
Auksztulewicz et al., 2017). This allows them to better change
their own prior beliefs as a function of the evidence generated
by their own (and others’) action. This captures, for instance,
the characteristic flow of information between agents following
exposure to cues of prestige, with prestigious individuals being
‘trend-setters’ and others following suit (Henrich and Gil-White,
2001; Veissière et al., forthcoming).
9It is useful to note that ostensive policies are salient insofar as they are
(but one) intentional means for rapidly increasing the precision of (certain
kinds) of hypotheses for another agent; e.g., that it is likely worthwhile to
attend to the individual generating the ostensive cues. The account on offer
therefore accommodates evidence suggesting that non-ostensive (unintentional)
but nonetheless attention-grabbing actions, like shivering, may have similar
effects on others’ attentional orienting as ostensive cues (de Bordes et al., 2013;
Szufnarowska et al., 2014).
10In numerical analyses of coupled communication, turn taking is usually
implemented by a reciprocal augmentation and attenuation of sensory precision –
so that one member of the dyad is listening while the other is speaking. Please
see Friston and Frith (2015a) more details. A more enduring asymmetry relates
to how one can learn from others, as illustrated using simulations of birdsong in
Friston and Frith (2015b).
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Additionally, such an asymmetry in information flow may
capture the dynamics of the coupled action-perception cycles
characteristic of interactions between human infants and
children, and adults. Experimental and computational evidence
suggests that older individuals possess relatively precise prior
expectations, relative to those of younger, less experienced
individuals (Wolpe et al., 2016; Karmali et al., 2018). Thus,
younger individuals may ascribe greater precision to sensory
information (Moran et al., 2014). The hypothesis here is, then,
that repeated couplings between infants and children with adults
(and more experienced peers) may cause the prior beliefs of
inexperienced individuals to converge more toward the hidden
causes generating sensory consequences (i.e., the mental states
of more experienced others), rather than the other way around
(Friston and Frith, 2015b; e.g., Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017).
That is, coupled action-perception cycles in such dyads tend to be
characterized by an asymmetric entrainment of prior beliefs (for a
closely related view, see Brownell, 2011).
What does this mean for the dynamics of (neural) belief
updating during interaction? Technically, attunement to the
niche instantiates the generalized synchronization of the statistics
of prior beliefs and the niche (e.g., others’ mental states); such
that the structure and dynamics of individual brains come to
recapitulate the structure and dynamics of the niche in which
they are embedded11 (Friston, 2012). This is depicted in Figure 4.
Synchronization is a phenomenon that occurs in coupled chaotic
dynamical systems (Pecora et al., 1997). Technically, it means
that there is a (diffeomorphic) function relating the dynamics
of the state of one system to those of the system with which
it is coupled (Pecora et al., 1995). For instance, modeling
results suggest that endowing two coupled hierarchical dynamical
systems with an expectation to infer the hidden causes generating
another’s actions enables a bidirectional flow of information
that synchronizes the statistics of their prior beliefs (Friston
and Frith, 2015a; Constant et al., 2018). Alignment within
and across coupled action-perception cycles means that the
similarity (technically, the mutual information) of individuals’
expectations increases (Friston and Frith, 2015b; Hasson and
Frith, 2016). In this scheme, attention functions as a kind of
coupling parameter, and its allocation is constrained by adaptive
priors. Attention effectively increases the amount of information
transferred from the system with precise priors to the system
with imprecise priors (i.e., the system increasing the gain of its
sensory states).
Indeed, studies in ‘two-person’ or hyperscanning
neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2013) have found evidence
of the synchronizing effects of the usage of cooperative
communication during, e.g., unidirectional person-to-
person monologs (Stephens et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017;
Pérez et al., 2017), person-to-group monologs (Schmälzle et al.,
2015), bidirectional person-to-person dialogues (Jiang et al.,
11Technically, hidden states are characterized by their sufficient statistics. This
denotes the minimum quantities needed to fully describe a probability distribution
(Cover and Thomas, 1991). For the Gaussian distributions used in active
inference, these are the mean and variance (see Buckley et al., 2017). Generalized
synchronization implies that the mutual information of (the dynamics of) the
states occupied by two (e.g.) chaotic dynamical systems is high (Pecora et al., 1995).
2012), and even between classmates and their teacher during
daily school activities (Dikker et al., 2017). Crucially, the
degree of interbrain synchrony of neural dynamics appears
to strongly predict psychological phenomena; for instance,
the subjective meaningfulness of communication (Stolk et al.,
2014), the accuracy of recall of the content of communication
(Zadbood et al., 2017), and the perceived ‘power’ of political
speech (Schmälzle et al., 2015; reviewed in Hasson et al., 2012;
Feldman, 2015; Hasson and Frith, 2016; Schoot et al., 2016;
Stolk et al., 2016). Indeed, the quality and amount of action-
perception couplings over the course of early development
better predicts later language ability (Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2015)
and language-related brain function (Romeo et al., 2018)
than more traditional measures, such as the number of words
heard (Lindsay et al., 2019). Similarly, synchronous interbrain
(limbic) dynamics in early infancy (i.e., prior to the onset
of cooperative pointing) appears to be concomitant with
several kinds of positive social experience, such as closeness
and social bonding12 (Atzil et al., 2014, 2017; reviewed in
Feldman, 2015, 2017).
Dynamics at the Timescale of Ontogeny
The dynamics sketched above suggests a kind of Vygotskian
scaffolding (Vygotsky, 1978; Moll and Tomasello, 2007) or ‘co-
construction’ (Tomasello, 2019) of the dynamics of internal
states; whereby – via recurrent engagement in loops of
coupled action-perception with relatively ‘entrenched’ aspects
of the niche – individuals learn (internalize) the salience
of culturally anticipated policies used to infer hidden states.
That is, by acting in a shared environment that contains
older, relatively inflexible individuals that perform stereotyped
behavior (characteristic of ‘how we do things here’), younger
individuals are able to learn the deontic value of policies
(Ramstead et al., 2016; Veissière et al., forthcoming). For our
purposes, this means that individuals’ prior beliefs become
more similar across couplings through (bidirectional) processes
of (asymmetric) enculturation13 (Renzi et al., 2017). That is,
recurrent episodes of acutely increased alignment – of the
kind typical of coupled action-perception cycles – are necessary
for the creation and maintenance of species-typical states. In
short, to gather evidence for an adaptive prior that mental
states are aligned, one must act to bring about sensory
states that are indicative of this belief (Chiel and Beer, 1997;
Byrge et al., 2014).
12To be clear, our claim is not that only the usage of communicative constructions
can give rise to interbrain synchrony (see, e.g., evidence of non-verbal interbrain
synchrony and associations with feelings of interpersonal closeness, Kinreich et al.,
2017). Communicative constructions are merely a (highly useful) means to gather
reliable evidence for the adaptive prior specified in the main text.
13For expository purposes we leave undiscussed the ontogenesis of critically
important and later-appearing interactions with peers (e.g., Brownell and Carriger,
1990; Ashley and Tomasello, 1998; Brownell et al., 2006; see Brownell, 2016).
Future explorations leveraging this approach should look to integrate data relating
to peer-peer interactions in ontogenesis (reviewed in Brownell, 2011). Indeed,
such phenomena are of great interest to the present account given the (possibly)
more complex dynamics exhibited by the attunement of two systems embodying
relatively imprecise expectations about how best to minimize uncertainty (e.g.,
Eckerman et al., 1989).
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FIGURE 4 | A simulation of free-energy minimization of the sort implied by the coupled action-perception cycle. Two birds – endowed with prior expectations about
the hidden states generating a shared (birdsong) narrative – sing for 2 s and then listen for a response. The posterior expectations for the first bird are shown in red;
and the equivalent expectations for the second bird are shown in blue (both as a function of time). The left panel shows chaotic and uncoupled dynamics when the
birds cannot hear each other (‘singing alone’), while the right panel shows the synchrony in hidden states that emerges when the birds exchange sensory signals
(‘singing together’). The different colors correspond to the three hidden states for each bird. When singing alone, the birds cannot hear each other (because they are
too far apart). Consequently, the dynamics diverge due to the sensitivity to initial conditions implicit in their (chaotic) generative models. The sonogram heard by the
first bird is given in the upper panel. Because this bird can only hear itself, the sonogram reflects the predictions about action based upon its (first- and
second-level) posterior expectations. Compare this to the case when the two birds can hear each other (‘singing together’). Here, the posterior expectations
encoded by internal states show (identical) synchrony at both the sensory and extrasensory levels, as shown in the middle panels (e.g., Pérez et al., 2017). Note
that the sonogram is now continuous over the successive 2 s epochs, because the first bird can hear itself and the second bird. The ensuing synchronization
manifold (i.e., the part of the joint state space that contains the generalized synchronization) is shown in the lower panels. These plot the second-level expectations
in the second bird against the equivalent expectations in the first. The synchronization manifold for identical synchronization corresponds to the (broken) diagonal
line. For details, see Friston and Frith (2015a). Obtained and adapted with permission from Constant et al. (2018).
Within and across interactions, such a dynamics increases
the adaptive value of, e.g., collaborative foraging strategies by
increasing inferred reliability in the hidden states generating
observations (others’ intentions; Han et al., 2015; Nakamura
and Ohtsuki, 2016). This is because gathering evidence for
the prior beliefs of other agents entails predicting how
their beliefs relate to the niche; i.e., how others’ beliefs
relate to one’s own mental states as well as non-social
affordances. Consequently, gathering reliable evidence for
others’ mental states entails redirecting attention triadically
(jointly). In this way, individuals become more reliable
models of their interlocutor(s), and hence may leverage their
own expectations about others’ actions to guide expectations
over sensory outcomes, like couplings with environmental
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affordances14 (e.g., Pezzulo, 2011; Gallotti and Frith, 2013;
Bach et al., 2014).
A useful way to increase the degree of alignment of prior
beliefs among individuals is to send more information to one’s
communicative partner. Holding the inferred common ground
constant, one of the main ways to convey more information
is to allow for hierarchically deeper policies (e.g., sequences
of sequences) to generate action; that is, roughly, to provide
more form (i.e., use longer communicative constructions).
In effect, more information about mental states is thereby
made observable. This perspective sheds interesting light on
the species-typical trajectory from triadic attention (Striano
and Stahl, 2005) to more reliably enacted forms of joint
attention underwritten by reciprocal information flow – and
the usage of pointing and gesture (Tomasello et al., 2007;
Carpenter and Liebal, 2011) – to more complex constructions
leveraged to transact with the hidden mental states of others
(Aureli and Presaghi, 2010; see Colonnesi et al., 2010). The
human agent appears to build up, nuance, and consolidate its
(mutually expected) repertoire of action policies that, based
on experience, have proven useful for adequately attuning
with the mental states of conspecifics. That is, through this
kind of continuous growth and hierarchical differentiation
in communicative action policies (Goldin-Meadow, 2007;
Tomasello, 2008), human individuals appear as though they
were learning to tune themselves to the niche, and the
niche to themselves.
Speaking generally, by repeatedly engaging in coupled
action-perception cycles, individuals distil and abstract deeper
observation-policy mappings (i.e., constructions) from the
bottom up; that is, on an item-by-item basis (reviewed in
Tomasello, 2000). In certain cases, individuals may then leverage
learned hypotheses (about how best to disambiguate mental
states) to reliably constrain the hypothesis space for learning
and inference about constructions15 (McClelland et al., 2010;
see also Tenenbaum et al., 2011). That is, induction at higher
layers of the model can serve to bootstrap learning at lower
layers. Such ‘domain-general’ learning processes are illustrated
by the model of Perfors et al. (2011). These authors provide
a proof of principle account showing that several hours of
child-directed input is sufficient for the posterior expectations
of a hierarchical approximate Bayesian (i.e., active inference)
learner – leveraging domain-general learning mechanisms – to
converge toward a single, high level hypothesis about the causes
of sensory input (here, a set of context-free grammars). That is,
14From this perspective, it may be interesting for modeling work to investigate
the notion of joint attention as an emergent property of coupling two hierarchical
generative models attempting to infer the hidden states of each other (e.g., Friston
and Frith, 2015a) while embedded in a broader ecological niche (e.g., Williams
and Yaeger, 2017). In such a context, does joint attention effectively function to
minimize a sensory Lagrangian over (jointly anticipated) sensory states (Sengupta
et al., 2016)? What role does cooperative communication play in maintaining such
a gauge invariance over the action of shared sensory states?
15Relatedly, because higher, contextualizing layers of a hierarchical model sample a
larger space of inputs in estimating a smaller number of (more abstract) hypotheses
(Tenenbaum et al., 2011), agents may, in certain instances, learn contextualizing
‘overhypotheses’ faster than learning at lower layers of the model (Gershman,
2017).
this set of context-free grammars had the greatest probability at
the end of training. Consequently, this empirical prior functioned
as abstract knowledge – it constrained expectations about likely
hypotheses (in particular, auxiliary fronting) at lower layers16 (see
also Kemp et al., 2007).
Indeed, modeling schemes employing active inference
provide evidence of their utility for modeling attunement
to a communicative system (e.g., Kiebel et al., 2008, 2009;
Friston et al., 2017b). For instance, Yildiz et al. (2013) used the
active inference formalism to model word learning under optimal
and noisy conditions and under variations in speaker accent.
By attending to incoming input (i.e., increasing the precision
of sensory signals), their model tuned its top–down beliefs to
the structure of training data, which comprised sequences (of
sequences) of spoken phonemes. The authors report that this
model outperformed other computational learning schemes
across a range of conditions and could be used to explain the
judgments of adult second language learners. Future modeling
work should investigate how an adaptive prior for alignment
covers more ecologically valid instances of attunement to
communicative constructions, such as the effects that ‘starting
small’ and a prolonged period of developmental immaturity
have on attuning to a communicative system (Elman, 1993;
Bjorklund, 1997).
As noted, alignment with communicative partners means
learning a set of ‘automatic,’ experientially robust (deontic)
observation-policy mappings; e.g., the expectation (for English
speakers) that a determiner typically precedes a noun (Meylan
et al., 2017). Indeed, this view fits nicely with usage-based
approaches to language acquisition (Tomasello, 2003; Lieven,
2016). Proponents of this view suggest that “constructions of
all types are automatized motor routines and subroutines”
that “come out of language use in context and. . . cognitive
skills and strategies used in non-linguistic tasks” (Bybee,
2003, both p. 158).
Indeed, much of the structure and dynamics of the
neural regions that underwrite the learning and usage of
cooperative communication have been exapted (in particular,
‘cooperativized’) from their earlier evolutionary functions
(Anderson, 2010; Bjorklund and Ellis, 2014). This has been
emphasized, for instance, by embodied neurosemantics models of
the neural underpinnings of the acquisition and comprehension
of meaning in form-meaning pairings (reviewed in Pulvermüller,
2013, 2015). In such approaches, the meanings of both concrete
and abstract constructions (e.g., ‘kick’ and ‘love,’ respectively)
are grounded in low level sensorimotor dynamics and action-
perception circuits contextualized by top–down input (Moseley
et al., 2012; also, Harnad, 1990).
16We urge the reader to take the model of Perfors et al. (2011) with some caution.
This is because part of the specification of their model was a set of (sets of)
grammars; that is, their model came ‘pre-equipped’ with knowledge of various
(formal, arbitrary) grammatical ‘principles.’ Thus, their model had simply to
converge on the most probable set of grammars (hypothesis) given in its ‘innate’
repertoire. However, there is (i) no clear evidence for such innately specified (i.e.,
formal and arbitrary) linguistic principles in humans (Da˛browska, 2015); (ii) no
clear formulation of what may be included in such an innate repertoire (Tomasello,
2004); and (iii) numerous logical problems with the evolution of such innate
structure (Christiansen and Chater, 2008; cf. e.g., Berwick et al., 2013).
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To elaborate, human brains effectively combine two kinds – or
two hierarchical levels – of general-purpose learning architecture
to capitalize on the epistemic opportunities afforded by the
action-perception cycle: (i) self-supervised (approximate
Bayesian) learning, via the dynamic, hierarchical interplay
between descending, neuronally encoded predictions and
ascending prediction errors over time (Badcock et al., 2019b);
and (ii) supervised (social) learning in a cultural niche via
repeated, immersive practice in a set of culturally patterned
routines (Roepstorff et al., 2010; Ramstead et al., 2016). In
effect, attuning to a system of communicative constructions
requires learning how to process and use form-meaning pairings
in real-time communication. Thus, we are in agreement with
Christiansen and Chater (2016a), who note that “learning
[a cooperative communication system] involves creating a
predictive model of the language, using online error-driven
learning” (p. 121).
Deploying these learning processes in species typical
communicative couplings means that, on average over time,
individuals’ communicative action policies become sufficiently
similar; that is, not identical, but usable (Tomasello, 2003;
Kidd et al., 2018). This is depicted in Figure 5. For instance,
Bannard et al. (2009) found that the perplexity (an information
theoretic measure that quantifies the fit of a distribution to a set
of observations) of the (probabilistic) context-free grammar used
to capture one child’s (Brian’s) utterances at age 2;0 (year;month)
was able to account for approximately 15% of the utterances of
another child (Annie, also 2;0). Similarly, the grammar imputed
to Annie at 2;0 was able to explain approximately 36% of the
utterances for Brian (2;0). Interestingly, at 3;0 model fit in either
direction was increased. Thus, the grammar imputed to Brian at
3;0 accounted for roughly 59% of Annie’s utterances (3;0), while
the grammar imputed to Annie at 3;0 accounted for about 63% of
Brian’s utterances (3;0). Though the authors did not compute the
significance of this change, this trend is precisely what one would
expect under our model; namely, a trend toward statistically
similar prior beliefs over hidden causes as individuals converge
toward their cultural attractor (Figure 5).
In sum, by repeatedly ‘filtering’ one’s action through others’
mental states, one obtains a useful set of policies for flexibly
and economically disambiguating prior beliefs. These correspond
to policies with a high deontic value (Constant et al., 2019).
In this way, one’s set of constructions appears to converge
on the set of constructions that constitute the communicative
system(s) that predominantly generate one’s sensory samples (i.e.,
those used by one’s speaker community). This is to say that
the prior beliefs of individuals converge toward an exploitable
degree of similarity. One thus instantiates a sufficiently reliable
model of the processes that generate sensory observations. This
ontogenetic tendency repeats itself, cyclically, across generations.
This has critical implications for the historical development of
least effort communicative systems, to which we now turn.
Dynamics at the Timescale of Cultural
Evolution
According to the model of cooperative communication proposed
here, communicative systems (i.e., the dynamics of sets of
form-meaning pairings) should appear, on average across time,
to minimize their variational free energy (Ramstead et al.,
2018). But what, exactly, does this mean; and how might this
claim be investigated empirically? As noted above, a pointing
gesture does not, in general, allow an agent to infer hidden
causes as efficiently or reliably as the usage of a more complex
construction. Therefore, in attempting to minimize their free
energy, communicative systems should evolve toward a balance
between usability and learnability (simplicity) on the one hand,
and on the other, increasingly arbitrary, hierarchically deeper
(complex) action sequences. This means that communicative
systems should appear to optimize an accuracy-complexity,
or expressivity-compressibility, trade-off (Tamariz and Kirby,
2016). Consider, for instance, the “drift to the arbitrary”
(proposed by Tomasello, 2008, p. 219). Here, the suggestion
is that ‘grainy’ bodily gestures like pointing give way to
increasingly expressive, ‘finer grained’ gestures like pantomime.
In turn, relatively expressive gestures give way to even more
expressive, ‘finely grained’ vocal gestures like abstract and
arbitrary communicative constructions (for similar views, see
Wilcox, 2004; Fay et al., 2013; Perniss and Vigliocco, 2014).
Interestingly, this roughly recapitulates the general ontogenetic
trajectory of cooperative communication described above. It
is as though – at multiple, nested scales of analysis – the
human agent were becoming increasingly adept at flexibly
deploying an increasingly sophisticated set of actions to resolve
its sensory ambiguity.
These ideas are supported by the finding that the dynamics
of relevance optimization across recurrent interactions, and
generations of speakers, manifests in constructions that increase
in expressivity with respect to production and processing
costs (Tamariz and Kirby, 2016; e.g., Fay et al., 2010; Kirby
et al., 2015). This means that human communicative systems,
after a sufficiently long period of evolution, tend to cluster
in a kind of ‘least effort’ subregion of a design space (i.e.,
parameter space) of communicative systems17 (i Cancho and
Solé, 2003; Seoane and Solé, 2018; see Evans and Levinson,
2009; Dediu et al., 2013). Expressed otherwise, relative to earlier
generations of users of a particular communicative system,
individuals in subsequent generations may be advantaged with
respect to the range of communicative constructions that can
be used to disambiguate mental states (Angus and Newton,
2015; perhaps, e.g., by coming to distinguish among previously
undistinguished actions; Senghas, 2003). That is, communicative
constructions themselves evolve to ‘fit,’ or gather evidence
for, the adaptive priors favored by evolution and the specific
demands of the local ecological niche (Kirby et al., 2007;
Christiansen and Chater, 2008; Perfors and Navarro, 2014).
This means that, over historical time, processes of cumulative
cultural evolution (e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Henrich,
2015) tend to increase the deontic value of constructions by
increasing the expressivity while minimizing the complexity of
using and learning such constructions (for similar viewpoints,
see Cornish et al., 2009; Dingemanse et al., 2015; Kirby et al.,
17To be clear, we are by no means claiming that this set of parameters exists in the
brains of speakers. We are talking here about a scheme for modeling the dynamics
of the cultural evolution of human communicative systems.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 417
fpsyg-11-00417 March 23, 2020 Time: 20:10 # 17
Vasil et al. Human Communication as Active Inference
FIGURE 5 | A duet for one. This Figure depicts learning and communication via repeated engagement in coupled action-perception cycles in the context of an
adaptive prior to align with conspecifics’ hidden states. (A) Shows changes in the posterior expectations of an order parameter of the first bird (blue) and second bird
(green) determining the chaotic structure of the songs depicted in Figure 4 (by number of reciprocal sensory exchanges). The shaded areas correspond to 90%
(prior Bayesian) confidence intervals. The broken lines (and intervals) report the results of the same simulation, but when the birds could not hear each other.
(B) Shows the synchronization of posterior expectations encoded by extrasensory areas for the first (i) and subsequent (ii) exchanges, respectively. This
synchronization is shown by plotting a mixture of expectations and their temporal derivatives from the second bird against the equivalent expectations of the first
bird. This mixture is optimized by assuming a linear mapping between the birds’ hidden states. In this example, the second (green) bird had more precise beliefs
about its order parameter and, therefore, effectively, ‘taught’ the first bird. Parameter estimation (learning) converges toward the same value resulting in (generalized)
synchrony between the two birds. For details, see Friston and Frith (2015b). Adapted with permission from Friston and Frith (2015b).
2015; Christiansen and Chater, 2016a; Tamariz and Kirby, 2016;
Fay et al., 2018).
Cooperative communication emerges as a multiscale,
self-organizing process that unfolds simultaneously across
interaction, ontogeny, and cultural evolution (also, de Boer,
2011). Consequently, the adaptive prior under consideration
enables, drives, and sustains each scale of dynamics. Circularly,
each scale of dynamics generates actions that appear to gather
evidence for the adaptive prior. Across developmental time,
the contextualizing dynamics of cultural evolution appear
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as a higher-order attractor – itself evolving in time, but
sufficiently stable from the perspective of the developing
individual – toward which individuals converge via recurrent
engagement in coupled action-perception cycles that unfold
in real-time. Taken together, interlocked dynamics at these
three scales entrench the existence (i.e., probability) of the
adaptive prior. In this way, cooperative communication becomes
a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, by gathering evidence for
their adaptive priors, the low-level dynamics of interactants
appear to create and maintain, at least for some period, the
observable coherence of a contextualizing scale of (cultural)
organization; namely, a communicative system (also see
Szathmáry, 2015).
In active inference, the partitioning in the timescales that
characterize a communicative system is formalized as between-
scale differences in the precision of prior beliefs as one ascends
scales (Constant et al., 2018; Ramstead et al., 2018). This
is the result of, e.g., increasing the number of components
(Smith et al., 2017) and the connectivity between components
constituting a communicative system (Reali et al., 2018). This
means that linear modifications to inputs to the system are
associated with non-linear changes in its dynamics (Beckner
et al., 2009; Shuai and Gong, 2014). Non-linearity is an
inherent property of self-organizing systems (Prigogine and
Stengers, 1984) and manifests in phenomena like critical
slowing (i.e., phase transition; Gandhi et al., 1998; i Cancho
and Solé, 2003), parameter reduction (Riley et al., 2011),
and chaotic dynamics (Sanders et al., 2018). A change in
the characteristic timescale of the dynamics of a cooperative
communicative system is exemplified by Smith et al. (2017).
These authors report experimental and simulation results
suggesting that multi-person communicative systems exhibit
slower regularization (decrease in conditional entropy) of a
plurality marker across generations relative to communicative
systems constituted by a single individual (for discussion of
disparities of the pace of change across communicative systems,
see Gray et al., 2013).
As noted above, the evolution of a communicative system
may be cast as motion through a design space of communicative
systems. Such spaces are effectively equivalent to the linguistic
morphospace (Gray et al., 2013), or the space of states taken
on by human communicative systems (e.g., linguistic networks;
Seoane and Solé, 2018). Motion in design space may be relatively
simple. For instance, Bybee (2010) has suggested that processes
of grammaticalization – where flexible lexical forms gradually
transition to fixed grammatical forms – may be modeled in
terms of unidirectional (i.e., irreversible) motion through a
continuous parameter space (also see Haspelmath, 1999). This
might be modeled as a strange (Lorentz) attractor (Bybee,
2010), similar to that observed in models of communicative
alignment (Friston and Frith, 2015a). In some cases, this
motion may be more complex. For instance, the selection
pressures acting on a system’s constructions and, hence, the
evolutionary trajectory of that set of constructions, varies as
a function of the size of the population of speakers (Lupyan
and Dale, 2010; Fay and Ellison, 2013; Reali et al., 2018; see
Dingemanse et al., 2015).
In sum, the cultural niche construction implicit in free energy
minimization in an ensemble of communicating conspecifics
can be seen as a form of active inference on a (cultural)
evolutionary level. In other words, selection pressures are
just free energy gradients that allow us to cast selection
(for useful communicative constructions) as a process of
Bayesian model selection to maximize fitness; i.e., model
evidence or the probability of communicative exchange, under
a shared generative (phenotypic) model. This perspective nicely
combines structure learning, evolution, and niche construction
within the same formalism. For further discussion, please
see Sella and Hirsh (2005), Frank (2012), Campbell (2016),
and Constant et al. (2018).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have outlined an extension to existing
theories of cooperative communication. Our extension is based
on active inference and provides a novel, integrative take on
the biobehavioral underpinnings of cooperative communication
that complements existing psychological accounts (Tomasello,
2003, 2008, 2014, 2019). A more complete account of the
dynamics entailed by the adaptive prior for alignment requires
an integrative approach to research. To be sufficient, such
research must aim to encapsulate the various timescales from
which this prior emerges, particularly in a way that renders
each scale of analysis complementary and mutually constraining
with respect to the others (Tinbergen, 1963; Ramstead et al.,
2018; Badcock et al., 2019b). The initial, though surely not
exclusive, timescales of interest for cooperative communication
were outlined in this paper. These range from the evolutionary
history of early humans, to the intergenerational transmission
of cultural patterns, down to individual development, and to
two people conversing in real-time. This multiscale framework,
arising from and underwriting the dynamics of the adaptive prior
for alignment, should help to facilitate an understanding of inter-
and intracultural similarities and differences in the structure and
function of culture, mind, and brain. We conclude with a few
comments about the limitations of the current proposal for the
adaptive prior for alignment.
One limitation is the relative dearth of ‘direct’ evidence
generated by empirical and computational studies of cooperative
communication guided by the notion of an adaptive prior for
alignment. We admit this is an important weakness, although
one which can only be remedied through future research.
Nevertheless, we have reviewed a substantial amount of indirect
evidence generated by a range of empirical and simulation studies
that speak to the integrative potential of the adaptive prior for
alignment in making sense of cooperative communication.
For instance, our approach can be used to model the neuronal
message-passing underwriting cooperative communication, as
implied by active inference (e.g., Bastos et al., 2012; Parr
and Friston, 2018). To illustrate this, regions in higher
layers of cortex, such as anterior cingulate cortex (ACC;
van den Heuvel and Sporns, 2013), integrate limbic afferents
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encoding salience with control policies issued by motor
cortex (Friston et al., 2014; Pezzulo et al., 2018). In turn,
descending connections from paralimbic cortex convey signals
that are unpacked as hierarchically nested sequences of
cooperatively motivated action and inference, such as declarative
pointing (Brunetti et al., 2014; see Holroyd and Yeung,
2012; Lavin et al., 2013; Haroush and Williams, 2015; Apps
et al., 2016; Chambon et al., 2017). Interestingly, these
neural considerations align with the psychological suggestions
of Hare and Tomasello (2005), who suggest that early
human selection pressures favored novel limbic dynamics that
encode an increased tolerance and trust for conspecifics in
the context of food (see the self-domestication hypothesis;
Hare, 2017).
One specific, promising modeling approach pertains the
usage of hierarchies of stable heteroclinic channels (SHCs; e.g.,
Rabinovich et al., 2014). SHCs are neuronally plausible models
of hierarchically deep sequences (i.e., state trajectories of state
trajectories) that may be scaled up to account for the acquisition
and processing of more realistic cooperative communication
data than have thus far been examined (Kiebel et al., 2009;
see Rabinovich et al., 2015). In particular, it may be possible
to use such a scheme to model the processing and use of
communicative constructions, as these are hierarchically deep
sequences of sequences (i.e., constructions are a statistically
reliable ordering or ‘chunk’ of, e.g., word classes that entail chunks
of morphemes that entail chunks of phonemes; relatedly, see
‘chunk and pass’ processing; Christiansen and Chater, 2016b).
Indeed, the (re)use of hierarchical processing for language use
may represent one instance of cooperativized, domain-general
cognition exapted for usage in a cooperative social milieu.
This is evidenced, for instance, by the presence of hierarchical
processing of an artificial communication system in infants
before 9 months of age (Kovács and Endress, 2014). Such
a (developing) processing capacity may then be biased by
the adaptive prior for alignment, after 9–12 months of age,
toward disambiguating hierarchically organized communicative
constructions (see Elman, 1993).
Another limitation of our proposal is that our consideration
of the ontogenetic trajectory of cooperative communication
focused exclusively on its typical trajectory. This was due to
concerns about space. We readily acknowledge that there are
all kinds of species atypical (i.e., unexpected) trajectories for
the phenotypic expression of the adaptive prior for alignment.
Arguably, studying how the dynamics of the adaptive prior
for alignment may be perturbed in ontogenesis is crucial (e.g.,
discerning neurocomputational atypicalities or atypicalities in
local niche dynamics; Thomas et al., 2019). Gaining a fuller
grasp on the adaptive prior for alignment requires the integration
of data and theory not just ‘vertically’ (i.e., across scales), but
also ‘horizontally’ between the niche and its denizens. That is,
the adaptive prior for alignment manifests distinctively not only
across an array of timescales, but also at any given time across an
array of cultural settings and, within cultures, neurotypical and
neurodiverse populations.
For instance, in the fourth section, we discussed how, in
neurotypical individuals, adequately explaining away sensory
causes depends on a delicate, finely tuned balance of the top–
down precision of hypotheses and the bottom–up precision of
sensory fluctuations. But consider the case of autism, where
neurocomputational atypicalities are thought to render the
individual oversensitive to incoming error signals (Lawson et al.,
2014; Mirza et al., 2019; see also Thomas et al., 2016). Such
individuals would still expect to align mental states (Jaswal and
Akhtar, 2019), and so would attend to others’ communicative
behaviors, but would be unable to attenuate the precision of
sensory signals (Hadjikhani et al., 2017; Mirza et al., 2019).
Consequently, during initial interactive couplings, such
individuals might initially look like they are typically developing
(i.e., attending to others’ eye gaze; Young et al., 2009). However,
repeated attention to sources of sensory uncertainty (e.g., others’
saccades), combined with an inability to adequately leverage
predictions to explain away this uncertainty (owing to too much
sensory precision), means that such individuals may develop
idiosyncratic or atypical phenotypic expressions of the adaptive
prior for alignment (e.g., avoiding eye gaze; Tanaka and Sung,
2016). In other words, early atypicalities in the internal dynamics
generating evidence gathering cycles of action-perception may
have downstream effects on joint attentional skills (Charman
et al., 1997; Nyström et al., 2019), attunement to and use of
communicative action policies (Loveland and Landry, 1986;
Warlaumont et al., 2014), mental state inference (Tager-Flusberg,
2007), and other means for alignment (Heasman and Gillespie,
2019). In short, aberrant inference in a prosocial, developmental
setting may easily lead to a pernicious kind of dyslexia – not for
the written word – but for any communicative exchange (i.e.,
joint inference).
In summary, the adaptive prior for alignment ‘sets the tone,’
as it were, for species-typical patterns of evidence gathering,
about oneself and the (social) world, that unfold over different
timescales. The adaptive prior for alignment is, in effect, a kind
of ‘best guess’ about the state occupied by the system at any
point in time. Thus, for a human, processes of action, inference,
learning, and (cultural) niche construction appear as if they were,
on average across time, in the service of gathering evidence for
the hypothesis that ‘I’ am like ‘you,’ that ‘you’ are like ‘me,’ and
that ‘we’ exist.
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